Swedish Military Bases of the Cold War: The Making of a New Cultural Heritage

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Abstract
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union completely transformed the military-political situation in the Nordic countries. The movement from invasion defence to input defence in Sweden has made many of the subterranean modern fortresses and permanent defence systems of the Cold War unnecessary. The current problem is what the administration authorities will do with the superfluous military buildings: let them fall into decay, preserve or reuse them – and for what purpose?

The aim of this article is to describe and analyze the cultural as well as spatial foundation of a new genre of heritage industry in Sweden – the cultural heritage of the Cold War – whose value is negotiated through a range of processes by the different stakeholders involved – emotional, social and cultural processes as well as legal and economic processes. The subterranean fortresses of Hemsö and Aspö are used as empirical case studies in the article. They both describe the making of a cultural heritage and illustrate the problems related to the ambitions of converting cultural heritage into tourist attractions.

One of the conclusions is that the previous making of the industrial cultural heritage in the 1980s and 1990s has many things in common with the one of the Cold War. The “post-military” landscape of bunkers and rusting barbed wires is regarded with the same romanticism and with similar preservation ideologies and economic interests as the post-industrial landscape was earlier. Similar negotiation issues appear, and these negotiations are carried out by similar stakeholders. The difference is that the military culture heritage of the Cold War was developed through a deeply centralized selection process directed by administration authorities, but was also influenced by certain persuasion campaigns and preservation actions made by local stakeholders such as retired officers and municipality administrations.

Keywords: The Cold War, cultural heritage, tourist attractions, military bases, post-military society, regional development, Sweden
Introduction

The fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union totally changed the military-strategic situation in the Nordic countries during the beginning of the 1990s. The military threat has been substantially revised. Today, defence systems such as that in Sweden require a large degree of unpredictability and mobility. Subsequently, the reorganization from invasion defence to input defence has made many of the modern subterranean fortresses and fixed defence systems of the Cold War era obsolete. Nevertheless, military bases are historical monuments and important keys to understanding the development of society during the 20th century. The question is what the armed forces and the state administration will do with this diversity of superfluous military buildings – will they allow them to lapse into complete disuse, or, preserve and reuse them, and if so, to what purpose and for what purposes?

This paper attempts to describe and analyze the foundation of an entirely new genre of cultural heritage in Sweden, the cultural heritage of the Cold War, with its value negotiated and regulated through a range of processes in practice by the different stakeholders involved, including emotional, social and cultural processes as well as legal and economic processes. The study is based on two case studies, one on the coastal artillery fortresses at Hemsö (Härnöand), and the other on Aspö (Karlskrona). Both cases study the making of a cultural heritage and illustrate the problems related to the ambitions of converting the cultural heritage into tourist attractions.

The study shows that the development of a tourist attraction both demands a blessing from culture heritage institutions, and from supportive local initiatives. Regarding the heritage of the Cold War, there is a common two-step-change based on an authorized heritage discourse; first, from military building to heritage – a conversion process which implies identification, selection and declaration – and secondly, from heritage to attraction – a valorization process which requires a local support both from authorities and private initiatives.

I argue that the preceding and analogous making of the industrial culture heritage in the 1980s and 1990s has many things in common with that of the Cold War. The “post-military” landscape of bunkers and rusting barbed wires is regarded with the same romanticism and with similar preservation ideologies and interests as the post-industrial landscape earlier was. Similar negotiation issues appear, and these negotiations are put forth by similar stakeholders. The main difference is that the military culture heritage of the Cold War was developed through a deeply centralized process directed by administration authorities, but it was also influenced by preservation campaigns on the part of local stakeholders.

The military landscape and the material culture of the Cold War could be a valuable contribution to cultural heritage tourism in terms of education and experiences. But why should one tell the story about the war that never came, repre-
sented with military structures that were never supposed to be seen, of which many have already been dismantled in silence?

**Research on the Cold War**

The *Cold War* is the name of the conflict between Western powers, mainly the U.S. and former communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, during the post-war period from 1946/47 to 1989/91. The research focus in this article is, however, the post-Cold War period. Research on the Cold War has recently included new perspectives and foci. Historical analysis of military strategies and foreign policy between the great powers still dominate the research field on the Cold War. On the international level, there is a coordination project based in Zürich, the *Parallel History Project*, which gathers researchers from various countries in primarily North America and Europe, who study different aspects of the Cold War with a main focus on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the Scandinavian countries, there are several ongoing research projects which aim to record and analyze how small European countries politically navigated on this political field during the Cold War; for example, the Swedish research program is *Defence and the Cold War* (FOKK) at the National Defence College, of which Thomas Roth’s *Försvar för folkhem och fosterland* (2007) are one publication related to this program.

To some extent, the ending of the Cold War marked a complementary turn to cultural studies in Cold War research with a greater focus on ideas, norms and cultures (See: Boym 1995; Cronqvist 2004; Salomon, Larsson & Arvidsson 2004; Miyoshi Jager & Mittner 2007). Interestingly, the cultural perspective was adopted early on by the discipline of archaeology, especially concerning the material culture of the Cold War. The anthology *Matériel Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth-century Conflict* (Beck, Johnson & Schofield 2002) and *A Fearsome Heritage* (ed. Schofield & Cocroft 2007) are two important examples of this tendency. The contributors of the latter book focus on the material culture of the Cold War. They emphasize the challenges of interpretation, from the Berlin Wall to the remains of an abandoned launch ramp for nuclear missiles in the UK. A similar investigation on former Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba was carried out by a Swedish-Cuban research team, lead by Mats Burström (Burström et al. 2009).

There are also examples of ethnographic contributions which highlight the transition processes in post-Cold War society, such as the ongoing PhD-project of Beate Feldmann on the transformation and remembrance of garrison towns in the Baltic Sea Area. However, there are few scholars who have described the institutional founding of the Cold War heritage in a retro-perspective. One example is Modern Military Matters (2006), in which the archaeologist John Schofield discusses the issue and gives a short summary of the making of the Cold War heri-
tage in Britain. Another example from the Swedish context is a short review of the heritage process written by Ingela Andersson & Anders Bodin (2008).

In sum, while there is an extensive research on the Cold War, there is still a lack of retro-perspective and reflexive studies of cultural analysis on the post-Cold War period. Therefore, this paper is intended to be a contribution to the international discussion. It is based on the author’s research report carried out in 2009, Kalla krigets försvarsanläggningar which describes the transformation process of Swedish Defence holdings into cultural heritage and tourist attractions. This comparative case study was empirically based on observations and interviews with the different stakeholders, but also, literature and archive studies.

**Theoretical Approach**

Cultural analysis is the main method applied in this paper in order to understand the transformation process from operative defence building to cultural heritage and tourist attraction. I will focus on the different conceptualization processes – cultural, emotional and social processes as well as legal and economic processes – which define and redefine the various functions of military structures. In this paper, the word *process* is not just considered to be a period of time in which something substantially changes. A process also requires stability. I choose to regard processes as *negotiations* in which change stands in relation to a continuum, i.e. conditions that are stable, conceived of as persistent and taken for granted.

This theoretical and somewhat postmodern point of view coincides with other scholars in the field of cultural heritage (Harvey 2001; Smith 2006). Laurajane Smith, for example, suggests heritage is a cultural process that “engages with acts of remembering that work to create ways to understand and engage with the present, and the sites themselves are tools that can facilitate, but are not necessary vital for, this process” (Smith 2006: 44). Smith not only considers heritage as a process, but also as a set of practices which form an *authorized heritage discourse*. These practices, as well as the meaning of the material “things” of heritage, are constituted by the discourses that simultaneously reflect these practices while also constructing them (Smith 2006: 12-3, 29). Basically, it is through such discourse that the Cold War is formed and regulated as a heritage by experts and institutions. This study more or less confirms the structuring theory suggested by Smith.

An additional theoretical problem is how to consider spatiality in view of this transformation process. The French sociologist Henri Lefebvre has analyzed the relation between space and social life. His thesis is that *(social) space is a (social) production.* This theoretical relation is also appropriate for this study. For example, I believe that the shift of function of military facilities is a shift in people’s (social) relation to and within that space. Social space can be considered to be a result of a social practice that is manifested at three levels and related to one an-
other, (1) how people experience space by involving collective symbols, bodily perceptions, and resistance to dominant practices (lived space), (2) how people consider space, perform, create routines, possess it and divide it into (social) zones (perceived space), and (3) how the stakeholders – such as architects and urban planners – articulate and intellectually conceptualise space as an abstract notion (conceived space) (Lefebvre 1991: 26, 33, 38-9).

In view of the theories of Lefebvre, there are two aspects of the term conceptualization which are relevant to this study. They are related to the way space and locations are taken into possession. One aspect refers to the legal framework that defines the use of a military building. When a building is redefined as a cultural heritage, it implies a legal shift which changes the overall conditions of using the building. The second aspect concerns the social and cultural relations within the former military facilities, for example, how people act as social and cultural individuals on site.

**Transition Processes**

The end of the Cold War caused a fundamental revision of Swedish foreign and military defence policy. Resolution of national states, democratization processes, national identity crises, and regional and ethnic conflicts all characterized the political situation in Europe during this time. The military threat during the Cold War – potential nuclear attacks and invasion wars between nations – was no longer a reality. As a result of the political détente in northern Europe, Swedish armed forces began an intensive and, for many employees, painful conversion process, known as the LEMO process. The number of units and recruits were more than halved in a period of few years. At the same time, international operations became increasingly important. The earlier invasion defence was replaced by a so-called “network-based input defence” according to new defence decisions.

All European countries were involved in such a transition process after the dissolution of the Warszawa pact. In former communist countries in Central-Eastern Europe, there has been a two-part process: the creation of a national army with a new agenda, and diminishing of its quantity. Its nuclear capacity has been phased out. In the path of this change, there have been limited ambitions to preserve the post-military landscape or to make use of the deserted military bases of the Red Army. Generally, it is considered to be a “negative heritage” in view of its negative connotations, which evoke the repression, militarism and the environmental destruction of the former Soviet domination. In the Baltic States, for example, there are very few examples of preservation actions with focus on the Cold War heritage. The military structures have either been destroyed or deserted, or reused for other purposes or regimes. However, the “Military heritage based tourism”-project in Latvia co-financed by EU (European Green Belt program) is one exception.
In contrast, the heritage process has been less problematic for the West European countries, which were either members of NATO or neutral. In the UK, several research and inventory projects began recording twentieth-century military remains in the 1990s, including the Cold War period. Alongside a greater awareness of twentieth-century military remains, the National Monument Records and locally held Sites and Monuments Records now typically incorporate these sites, embedding them further as a part of Britain’s cultural heritage (Schofield 2004: 3-4). Additionally, other European countries have conducted single studies on selected structures, such as the Ijsselline in the Netherlands.

The Cold War heritage is also a heritage of alliances. Therefore, the international connection is as important as the national one. However, the question of ownership might appear to be a problem. Since 1991, the Department of Defence in the US has been engaged in what they call the Legacy Resource Management Program, the stated purpose of which is to “inventory, protect, and conserve the Department of Defence’s physical and literary property and relics associated with the origins and development of the Cold War at home and abroad” (Cocroft 2003: 264). The American ambitions to protect their interests abroad have sometimes resulted in disagreements of ownership in foreign countries. For example, in Berlin, the preservation of Cold War icons such as Checkpoint Charlie and the Berlin wall have been disputed (Franzmann 2008: 3).

The Scandinavian countries undertook a comparable heritage process concerning their Cold War heritage. The conversion process had a major impact on the fixed fortifications along the extended Scandinavian coastline, basically the coastal artillery, including subterranean bomb shelters, artillery and other weapon systems, lodging barracks, service structures, training establishments, and coastal reconnaissance stations. They were particularly important for the invasion defence during the Cold War. Cocroft suggests a broad definition of Cold War “monuments” which is useful for this article, that is, “structures built, or adapted, to carry out nuclear war between the end of the Second World War and 1989” (Cocroft 2003: 3).

In a Swedish context, the Swedish Fortifications Agency (FORTV) was commissioned to identify which military bases were valuable enough for preservation, early in the 1990s. The aim was to: “from a national perspective, ensure the preservation of representative buildings that are able to demonstrate the development of the art of fortification”. The outcome of this commission was a report which had fundamental importance to the next step in the process. The authors note that modern fortifications from the late 1800s to modern times have not received any interest. They stress that these are a forgotten and hidden cultural treasure that must be saved from perishing (Från Oscar-Fredriksborg till Ersta 1994: 6).

This investigation formed the basis of the National Heritage Board’s (RAÄ) proposal that followed in 1996. The National Heritage Board made a selection of forty items that they felt should be listed as historic buildings, with most of them
from the 1900s. Since then, the government has declared fifteen of these to be of national interest.

Parallel to the phasing-out of fortifications, another institutional restructuring process took place between the Armed Forces and cultural heritage institutions. A workgroup was commissioned to prepare a proposal for a general preservation of the Swedish military heritage, and to find new forms of collaboration. The proposal also included deposited military material. A large number of local military-historical museums were finally reduced to a handful of representative museums as a consequence of the investigation made by the workgroup, which also suggested that the Cold War should be the main theme (Försvar i förvar 2005: 5). A network named the Swedish Military Heritage (SMHA) was founded in 2008, and was a joint project of the National Museums of Military History (SFHM) and the National Maritime Museums (SMM).
Hence, the streamlining of the armed forces in the 1990s not only implied a phasing-out of military bases, but also an identity-rated rationalization of the Swedish Defence. The decommissioning of military units led to the dissolution of military regiments, but also, to the dissolution of local military-historical museums. Before the restructuring, local military museums – often associated with military units – were primarily museums for the military. Since then, they have undergone an “evolutionary process of military-historical museums” of which only a few have been upgraded to professional museums. After this streamlining, the remaining military museums changed character, and became more professionalized and more focused on cultural history (Försvar i förvar 2005: 6, 15-20).

After a series of enquiries, the National Property Board was finally commissioned to investigate the conditions for the preservation and valorization of the seventeen major military bases that were built during the 1900s. The investigations were carried out in collaboration with several other related culture heritage institutions. The final report from the National Property Board was presented in 2007, with cost estimates and assessments of the task of preserving and managing these buildings. It is now the principal document for the ongoing heritage process to convert some of the structures into museums.

The rationalization of the armed forces in Sweden and elsewhere nevertheless had consequences on a purely individual level. The armed forces and the defence industry lost many jobs through rationalization, when military units closed. Dismissals were followed by a renegotiation of both identity and professions. In the middle of their careers, many officers were suddenly forced to change their livelihood.

The book Solen skiner alltid på en kustartillerist is perhaps the best depiction of the process of dismantling the coastal artillery in Sweden. It describes the changeover process at an individual and personal level. The photographer Martin Nauclér and journalist Jan-Ivar Askelin made a series of visits to secret caves of the coastal artillery which have now been disarmed and closed. They followed the persons who once built and managed the coastal artillery structures, but also those who finally were tasked to dismantle them.

The title of the book means “the sun always shines on the coastal artillerist”, that is, the sun always shone on those who had been selected to manage the coastal artillery, despite how difficult it might be to remain underground. The expression still exists even though the military is gone. The Swedish Coastal Artillery was built up in stages during the 1900s. It was a huge project; built in great secrecy during the Cold War and then dissolved into oblivion: “We were secret and now it is all gone and no one has seen it”, says Leif Cimrell, who is one of several personal portraits in the book and the one who received the directive to organize the dismantling of the coastal artillery guns. When precision weapons were mentioned during the Gulf War in the early 1990s, many coastal artillerists realised that an era had come to an end. But the death blow came with the Defence deci-
sion in 2000, and the major dismantling was then carried out (Askelin & Nauclér 2007: 129-30, 157, 163).

**Mouldering Processes: The Aesthetics of Decay**

Nauclér & Askelin’s neatly packaged narrative of dismantlement, depicted by images of rusting cannons and humid rock shelters, is very similar to the narratives of the industrial heritage which have been explored since the 1980s. From an aesthetic point of view, Nauclér and Askelin’s book follows the same visual formula of how industrial ruins of dirt and rust and emotional moods of transience are usually depicted in photography, such as Bernd and Hilla Becher’s pioneering documentation of the disappearing industries in the 1960s. Paul Virilio, contemporary of the Becher’s, included similar aesthetic contemplations on the remains of Hitler’s Atlantic Wall in France. The geometric harshness of the bunker form merges with melancholy and dreamlike bitter sweetness. Later, he gathered his photos and thoughts in the book *Bunker Archaeology*, which was groundbreaking in the way in which it re-valuated the modernist military-historical landscape of WWII (Virilio 1975).

Robert Willim has described the rediscovery of industrial society and the popularization of it. In *Industrial Cool*, he creates a post-industrial exposé which goes from the Bechers’ photographic depictions to today’s recycling of obsolete factories (Willim 2008: 92-7). There is an aura over abandoned sites such as factories and bunkers in dilapidation which evokes feelings of nostalgia, declination and mutability, similar to the ruin-aesthetics of the late 1700s. There is an excitement in digging in “the dustbin of history”, as seen in the book *Övergivna platser* (Abandoned places) by Jan Jörnmark (2007). The text is a personal reflection on recent Swedish de-industrialization, illustrated with pictures of decay which encourage a contemplative mood.

A similar depiction of ruins romanticism and nostalgia is given by the Swedish journalist Peter Handberg, who traced the locations of the nuclear bases in the Baltic States using GPS. He ended up with a series of reports based on interviews with the locals and former Soviet officers (Handberg 2007). Most of the military bases such as Forst Zinna in former GDR (Boulton 2007: 181), are either being totally dismantled or left to decay, while others are being reused. Literature like Jörnmark’s and Handberg’s, and film documentaries such as Angus Boulton’s *Cood Bay Forst Zinna* (2001) are all important depictions used to popularize the heritage, and thus, are an integrated part of the heritage process.

It is not unusual that abandoned environments like these ones work as free zones and hideaways – found spaces – where youngsters can express their creativity or destructiveness: secret parties, spontaneous grilling, rock climbing, and graffiti. Bunkers are popular places for subculture groups looking for vanished environments that are cordoned off and abandoned, so-called urban exploration.
These types of activities are often radically opposed to the view of the authorities as to how cultural heritage should be used and operated.

The decommissioning of military structures creates a historic landscape in which many of these become ruins and relics of a bygone era. It is a military-historical landscape which is basically a cultural landscape: shaped by the human influence of military activities but adapted to the geo-topographical conditions of place (Roll 2000: 142). The ruins are considered authentic evidence of military activity in the past. They may be perceived as an antithesis to preservation. But the ruins are not left alone without intervention. The Armed Forces and the heritage institutions are required to make the military-historical landscape harmless to people by the preservation law. In many cases, barbed wires and destructive vegetation have been removed so that they do not harm people, or the structure itself. According to Andersson & Bodin, a few years without dehumidification will obliterate all chances to preserve modern subterranean fortresses. Hence, the mouldering process of the Cold War heritage is fast and aggressive in comparison to similar elder monuments (Andersson & Bodin 2008: 94).

A common strategy of the Norwegian antiquarian authorities is to avoid human impact on the remains of Regelbau, the Atlantic Wall. Lisen Roll states: "[military buildings] are beautiful in the way they are dissolved into dust. But they will for a foreseeable future remain as interesting traces in the landscape, both as a source of knowledge and experience" (Roll 2000: 142). This approach implies a sort of "fossilization" which is culturally productive. Decay does not signify an antithesis
to preservation; it can instead imply a lower degree of preservation which offers a secure and aesthetically considered decay. Thus, processes of wearing and tearing are culturally productive in that they are able to appeal to nostalgia (Löfgren 2006: 53).

Nauclér & Askelin’s coffee-table-like book on the transition process and the dismantling of the coastal artillery is very much seen through the contemplative mood of nostalgia. Not only in this case, but also in general, nostalgia has always been an unspoken and culturally productive undertone in the heritage process.

**Defining the Cold War Heritage**

The Cold War heritage, including closed batteries and fortresses, abandoned areas for military shooting exercises and ramparts, involves visible remnants in the military-historical landscape. Some military buildings have become ruins, others museums. During the past fifteen years, an entirely new genre of cultural heritage has emerged as a consequence of the restructuring of the national defences. It raises two main questions.

First, what kind of knowledge does this heritage possess? Why is it important to tell the story about “the war that never came”? Of course, there are different national agendas involved in defining a Cold War heritage; nationalism is one of them. The Cold War formed a backdrop to many spheres of national life – political, economic, scientific and cultural – rising to the fore in times of tension between the superpowers. Hence, it is important in order to understand the historical conditions of the today’s society. This is one of the main arguments outspoken for preserving a Cold War heritage (See Fairclough 2007: 30).

The first Swedish heritage report from 1994 speaks about “a neglected heritage”, which the authors believe the public should be introduced to. Even follow-up investigations consider the Cold War era to be an important culture-historical starting point in depicting a larger narrative of the Cold War and its importance to the emergence of the Swedish welfare state in the course of the 20th century. One common argument – i.e. used by the stakeholders of Hemsö fortress – is the value of understanding the breadth of the efforts of war preparation, but more important, to inform the tax-paying citizens as to what their money finally was spent on and how it affected the landscape in some places.

There are more arguments in favour of bringing out this heritage. Samuel Palmblad calls attention to the value of understanding the complexity which characterizes the military structures and how the total defence system worked in practice. He states that the artifacts are important in a historical perspective as they highlight a willingness to defend national independence. At the same time, the artifacts revitalize a historical period which was characterized by nuclear doomsday prophecies at times (Palmblad 2005: 8-10). All of these arguments are reasonable, but there are also counter-arguments which bring out the problems of
prioritizing assets and the discourse of negative heritage. For the Baltic people for example – unless one takes into account the Russian minority – the heritage of the Cold War is not a primary object of remembering, but of forgetting, or, of locating pro-Soviet counter-histories (Hackman 2003: 88-9).

Secondly, in what way was the cultural-historical value of the modern military facilities created, and how has it been deployed? The institutional procedure of identifying, selecting and declaring the cultural heritage are important parts of the upgrading process, but it is not the only basis for value creation. The culture heritage of the Cold War was developed through a deeply centralized and selective process directed by heritage institutions. In Scandinavia, as in the UK, a series of valuating investigations were crucial to the foundation of the cultural heritage.

My study has shown that the military bases in Sweden have been upgraded to historical buildings and developed into tourist destinations at different rates and levels. Before the transition process started, there were few modern military structures considered to be historical. The reason why the heritage process started as late as in the 1990s was because of military confidentiality and inaccessibility. Obviously, many of these structures were still in use. But there might be other reasons as well. They are not as monumental and visible in the terrain as older fortifications, and, perhaps they were not considered to have any aesthetical values.

The selection process has implied a range of institutional negotiations focusing on historical value, responsibility and costs: on the one hand, national institutions such as FORTV, SFV and RAÄ, and on the other hand, regional cultural heritage institutions and private initiatives. The valuation basis generally applied in cultural heritage institutions (rarity, representativeness, originality, continuity and architectural value) was adjusted in the initial report. An important basis for selection was to protect at least one of all common types. Geographical distribution, proximity to valuable natural areas and established tourist destinations have also been indicative, while architectural importance was toned down in the selection process because of the motivation that aesthetic matters were rarely considered when the modern fortresses were constructed. SFV’s follow-up investigation had a somehow pragmatic approach to the selection process. The authors balance criteria of quality with costs in order to sort out objects in good condition to make preservation a realistic alternative (Kostnader för att bevara och levandegöra försvarsanläggningar 2007: 17-22).

A fundamentally important part of this maturation process is the formalization procedure, i.e. when the buildings are formulated in legal terms as a cultural heritage by administration authorities and cultural heritage institutions. However, the selection process was influenced by certain persuasion campaigns and preservation actions initiated by local stakeholders such as retired officers and local authorities. In many cases, it was the officers – retired or still active – who initiated the rescuing campaigns of spare parts and furnishings. Their actions helped to
generate a cultural and historical value as much as the heritage institutions did. In my view, they functioned as a catalyst in the heritage process. There are cases – such as Hemsö fortress or Arholma battery outside Stockholm – where local driving forces and the municipality influenced the cultural heritage institutions to finally recommend a heritage declaration. In this way, other parties are deeply engaged in the process of formulating the culture-historical value before it finally was formalized.

There are several examples of spontaneous rescue actions. When the coastal artillery unit of KA2 on Aspö was shut down, a group of historically interested officers managed to rescue military material and spare parts for the mobile coastal artillery museum on the island of Aspö. The retired officer Olle Melin is one of the driving forces behind a group of enthusiasts who are interested in the military history of Aspö. He tells the following story about the coastal reconnaissance station on Aspö:

With the help of the retired officer at KA5 who was appointed to deliver the used material to Estonia and Latvia, we got out with enough spare parts. So that we can run the station and show: this is reconnaissance; get the magnetron out so that we do not interfere with current Navy reconnaissance frequency. [...] We can go down with a guided group and start the station. We can, with radar screens and everything, show how we looked for enemies during the Cold War in the 1950s; like today, but with a little bit more sophisticated equipment. I think that would be an aha-experience. (Interview with Olle Melin, 06-10-2008)

In secret and against all odds, driving forces have sought to rescue the cultural heritage of the Cold War from vanishing. In this way, each preserved screw nut holds a symbolic meaning: Is there a feeling of existential security in knowing that the station actually can be started up again? On an imaginary plane, the control lamps have never gone out. At the same time, this is an expression of resistance and counter-powers in the struggle against the course of history, but also, against the authorities – their defining power – and the structural dismantling of the defence systems. Psychologically and metaphorically speaking, the battle is not lost, because there are still enough spare parts. The coastal defence is still intact and nothing is in vain.

Behind these preservation actions there is a strong interest in history, but also emotional ties and personal relations to the environments which were the place of work for many of the enthusiasts for many years. Melin continues:

I have a passion for Aspö as a preserved object. There is an emotional connection. Furthermore, I consider it this way; you can preserve the citadel of Drottningknär, dating from the 1600s; everyone regards it as history. But in a hundred years, at that moment, all modern buildings have become history. Therefore, there must be something left to remind us about this époque. The longer you wait, the harder it becomes to document. People who have worked here, they are gradually disappearing. We, the enthusiasts, who work at the museum on Aspö, are really worried, not for the museum, but for the competence of the military material. So, today, we are a group of five to ten persons. The youngest one is about 58 years. No one has thought of engaging new people. What shall we do then, in ten years? (Interview with Olle Melin, 06-10-2008)
Cultural heritage is usually a result of crises and structural changes in society (Aronsson 2005: 20). At the same time, it is a reflection of the same. Times of rapid modernization and structural shifts often evoke feelings of loss and create a need to freeze the state of things, as in the quoted conversation. Memory is an important part of this mental conversion process. Memory is a cultural process of both remembering and forgetting, which is fundamental to our ability to conceive of the world (Misztal 2003: 1).

In line with this description of rescue actions, Smith argues that there are subaltern and dissenting heritage discourses complementary to the authorized one which critiques the nature, meaning and use of heritage. But, she adds, such initiatives tend to be assimilated by the institutional top-down structure (Smith 2006: 29, 35-7). Likewise, Peter Aronsson argues that the formation of a cultural heritage does not always undergo the same formalization process. He observes at least three fundamental perspectives in the establishment of a cultural heritage. First, there is a pragmatic perspective which includes what people generally regard as their heritage, without any interference from the government or cultural heritage institutions. Second, there is a scientific perspective, which identifies cultural heritage through an academic discussion. And third, a normative perspective in which cultural heritage is directional for the future. In this case, political and economic functions in society, such as rural politics and regional-economic development, play a greater role in the foundation of a cultural heritage than what actually happened (Aronsson 2005: 25).
Considering the cases of Aspö and Hemsön, all of these three perspectives interact with each other, albeit with different emphases and timetables. The fortress of Hemsö was proposed as an object for preservation early in the process by the Swedish Fortifications Agency. Pending the decision of preservation, the Ministry of Culture in Sweden was called on by a group of representatives from the regional county council, the municipality of Härnösand, the Northern Naval Command, and the local friendship association of the fortress lead by a former officer. The group presented a request in which Hemsö fortress is suggested to be recognized as a historic building (Interview with Hemsö Skärgårdsförening 01-09-2008). This local initiative placed the pressure on the decision-makers. Consequently, it resulted in a national heritage declaration of Hemsö fortress in 1998. It has been of great importance for the subsequent process. In comparison, a couple of the military facilities on Aspö were also mentioned in the initial report from 1994, but they were finally up-graded to national historical monuments much later, in 2003. By taking rapid action, Hemsö fortress had a five-year head start in attraction and destination development compared to Aspö because of the meeting with the Minister of Culture.

Redefining Military Space: Displaying the Cold War

The creation of museums is a fundamental part of the definition process. It is the ultimate affirmation of the value of a heritage in the authorized heritage discourse. As Hodgin & Radstone (2003: 12-3) state, “memorials and museums represent public statements about what the past has been, and how the present should acknowledge it; who should be remembered, who should be forgotten; which acts or events are functional, which marginal.” The artifacts on display give material form to the past and anchor authorized and official collective memory (Davison 2005: 186).

Cold War museums have become a new genre of museums around the world, from national Cold War museums to local military-historical museums related to specific sites. In Sweden, 25 museums are included in the military-historical museum network of SMHA, which was a result of national rationalizations. At least 22 of them have a Cold War-connection in one way or another, and half of them have the Cold War as their main focus. Thus, there is a remarkable emphasis on the Cold War.

In the UK, preservation and museum display have so far largely been through private initiative, such as at Anstruther in Fife. In Canada, the Diefenbunker near Ottawa is nowadays a Cold War museum of national interest, and in the US, preservation has focused on saving and interpreting a number of monuments, i.e. the Nike missile site near the Golden Gate Bridge. Within the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, protocols did allow for the preservation of a limited number of sites, such as the South Dakota Minuteman II missile launch facility. Additionally, for
Stevnsfort was Denmark’s only subterranean fortress during the Cold War. Nowadays, it is a popular tourist attraction and a Cold War museum.

For the united Germany, the Cold War monuments seem to be of great importance. Not less than 26 museums have been established along the German East-West Iron curtain. Berlin has a special focus, even though the cityscape has been transformed since the end of the Cold War. The Stasi headquarters and a small part of the wall still remain, while the security bunker of Erich Honecker has been sealed. In Nemenčinė, Lithuania, there is a rare and somehow odd example from the cultural heritage industry, where a Cold War drama of oppression is acted out in a Soviet bunker. Otherwise, there are very few military-historical museums with a Cold War focus in the Baltic States, apart from the national museums of occupation.³

So, what happens when buildings shift and lose their original functions, for example, becoming museums? The closing of military bases after the end of the Cold War and the succeeding national declaration of historical buildings have implied a spatial, social and cultural redefinition of space. People’s attitudes towards the buildings and their spatial behaviour have radically changed. Previously, military barriers, roped-off areas, safety regulations all structured the social practices of both soldiers and civilians, inside and outside of the fence. Foreigners were prohibited to stay in military security zones, and photography was generally forbidden. Today, everyone can visit these same areas.
Reconsidered space. Yesterday, no photo, cameras strictly forbidden. Today, the camera is the primary tool for tourists visiting the heritage site.

Photo: Per Strömberg.

The former roped-off areas of secret military activities also had a symbolic meaning during the Cold War. Secrecy was part of the Cold War image, propaganda and the protection-culture in Sweden. The former ideology of representation was based on invisibility and secrecy, but also marked boundaries. Historian Magnus Rodell believes that bunkers and fortresses also work as mental instruments to define limitations and borders by their locations and physical presence, which also tells us about times past, political agendas and power (Rodell 2007: 72-3).

There is a contradiction within these sites. Once, they were roped-off by fences, and now they function as attractions for tourists whose main tool of processing the tourist site is the camera. However, the hush-hush atmosphere that surrounded military activities during the Cold War is also used in marketing the attraction. Hemsö fortress was earlier promoted by the catchy slogan: “Visit the Cold War secret”. It is an example of how associations, nostalgia and collective images of secrecy can be turned into an argument for visiting the site.

Since the County Museum became the principle of Hemsö fortress in 2009, the concept of being a museum has been strengthened. What once was a workplace has now been turned into a tourist attraction. The County museum introduced a new museum concept by installing barriers and pedagogical tools such as film projectors, loudspeakers and other kinds of museum equipment. The intention was
to let visitors to stroll on their own inside the building, not to experience the fortress with the help of guided tours.

But by installing this entire museum apparatus, the historical building has shifted function and spatial conception in such a way that it affects its user identity as a military building. At the same time, this encroachment challenges its fundamental cultural value, which once was the basis for the declaration of cultural heritage. In my view, the county museum of Murberget has adapted the subterranean fortress to the museum function, and not the reverse, adapting the museum function to the building and its former user value. This is a common practical problem for military structures whose spaces are complex and specific, and therefore, difficult to adapt to the museum function.

Preservation principles and safety regulations might to some extent inhibit use. According to law, a building which is declared as historically valuable shall not be “demolished, filled, corrupted or transformed”, and all the furnishings shall be preserved on site (Framställning om byggnadsminnesförklaring 1998). When the military bases were in service, servicemen and military personnel were not included in normal safety regulations. Bases are usually extra-legal jurisdictions not subject to civil law. One of the enthusiasts at Aspö states in an interview on the possibilities of re-opening an old coastal radar station, Gruvan, as a tourist site: “If you have to adapt Gruvan to disabled people. Well, then we can forget this.” (Interview with Olle Melin 06-10-2008) Regulations of historically valuable buildings as well as accessibility, fire and safety regulations all limit the possibilities of reutilization.

The redefinition of space is also a production of space in a new social context. The way space is divided into and defined as a social zone has been described by Henri Lefebvre in his analysis of the relationship between spatiality and social life. There is a change in meaning – a conceptualization – but also a change in spatial performance, when space acquires new values of representation through the process of becoming a cultural heritage. Visitors activate learned schemas of watching, touching and moving whilst they enter the fortress of Hemsön. It occur new social zones when the fortress suddenly represents history rather then national defence. Today, the batteries protect memories, not borders.

The main entrance to Hemsö fortress, in service 1957-1989. Photo: Per Strömberg.
Destination Development, EU-projects and Archipelago Politics: The Islands of Aspö and Hemsön in Comparison

Castles and fortresses have always fuelled local tourist industries. The valorization of cultural heritage through attraction and destination development is an important aspect of the heritage process; it’s where the heritage is performed, stated and made in practice. The term “valorization” is defined as any activity that aims to improve the knowledge and conservation of cultural and environmental heritage, and which will increase its fruition. To only identify and preserve military structures are not enough to establish a heritage. These structures also must be conceived and perceived as a heritage. As Birgitta Svensson claims, it’s not the traditional institutions of heritage preservation which primarily create the experience values which today attract people to the Swedish heritage sites, but the tourism industry (Svensson 1999: 110).

As the Cold War heritage is a recent genre, there is not really any acknowledgment among people that this is a heritage worthy of preservation, Palmblad argues. It is difficult to engage people and politicians, and to emphasize the incentive of identity creation, as the heritage is highly unknown and still invisible and unreachable (Palmblad 2005: 12). Nevertheless, Svensson states that it is in rural areas and economically disadvantaged parts of the country, for example Härnösand municipality, where regional developers are the most eager to take advantage of the heritage for the purpose of regional tourism development. These projects are of course most important in places with high levels of unemployment, or when residents have lost their previous employment (Svensson 2005: 158-9).

The past military presence on the islands of Aspö and Hemsö was a part of everyday life and the local context. Today, the bunkers still exist, like emotional reminders of a bygone era. However, their symbolic significance for the islanders of Aspö and Hemsö has not been reduced because the military base was closed down. Especially the entrepreneurs see the chances to take advantage of the symbolic value: bike and kayak renters, restaurant- and youth hostel keepers. For them, the closing of the military base appears to be a symbol of optimism and new opportunities. But what role do the local administration and regional heritage institutions actually play regarding destination development in these two cases?

In recent decades, the archipelago outside Karlskrona, including Aspö, has undergone a structural change which has caused the disappearance of three primary industries: the coastal fisheries, agriculture and the Defence. In an attempt to stimulate new industries, the municipality of Karlskrona carried out an IT-venture in the archipelago area, but with a mediocre outcome. The former cultural manager in Karlskrona, Ivar Wenster, considers the “Stavanger-model” to be an ideal model for community planning in areas of stagnation. The model primary uses available resources in order to develop new industries.

Nonetheless, Wenster is not convinced that tourism is the only, or the best, solution for islands like Aspö, or the Karlskrona archipelago. “Karlskrona is great at
cultural heritage”, Wenster says. In 1998, Karlskrona was upgraded to UNESCO’s world heritage list with the name The Naval Port of Karlskrona. The world heritage list consists of many cultural objects of international interests. In this way, Karlskrona is “great at heritage”. However, Wenster argues that the city does not have the experience necessary to become really good at tourist hospitality. The world heritage is geographically limited to the area close to Karlskrona, but is also limited in time to the period before 1870s, which excludes Aspö from the world heritage. He doubts whether the modern military facilities on Aspö really are valuable enough to belong to this group (Interview with Ivan Wenster 7-10-2008). Wenster’s opinion is significant for the local administration’s attitude towards the Cold War structures located outside the city.

Investigations carried out by SFV point to Aspö’s proximity to the world heritage as a major success factor in order to revitalize the heritage on the island (Kostnader för att bevara och levandegöra försvarsanläggningar 2008). However, it would legally be difficult to extend a world heritage site. Among the public institutions, it is rather the Swedish Property Board (SFV) than the city of Karlskrona and the main heritage institutions (SMM, SFHM, SMHA) that has run the development of preservation and revitalization of the military history on Aspö. For example, SFV has invested quite a bit in the restoration of the old citadel of Drottningkär, on which SFV created a small exhibition on Aspö’s military heritage during the summer of 2008. According to one of the driving forces involved in the Aspö-process, there are nearly no initiatives coming from the municipality; “It is a priority issue”, Wenster declares. Karlskrona municipality geographically includes thousands of similar facilities on both a large and small scale, together with the world heritage. From that point of view, the proximity to the world heritage is rather a disadvantage.

Since there is no permanent connection to the mainland, Aspö can finance their projects with structural funds from the EU: “Objective 2 Islands 2000-2006”. The development projects on Aspö have had – directly or indirectly – a connection to tourism, but not especially to the military-historical heritage: the construction of a marina, the preparation of bike paths, a tourist guide for mobile phones, and the formation of women’s network for entrepreneurs (Genomförda projekt 03-09-2009).

Hemsön is also covered by EU-support for rural archipelago areas because the inhabitants must take the ferry to the island. Structural funds did have a major role in the development of Hemsö fortress as a tourist attraction. Since the fortress successfully was opened to the public, the archipelago association of Hemsön, together with the municipality of Härnösand, have successively in a period of 1998-2008 applied for and received money for this purpose. The projects included construction of parking places, signage, guide teaching, inventory care, and exhibition production on a basic level.
Attractive surroundings. One of many Cold War installations on Aspö island. There are still military presence at Karlskrona naval port, which has become a UNESCO World Heritage. Photo: Per Strömberg.

The Rural Development Agency is responsible for the EU-programs directed towards the Swedish archipelago. They have identified three success factors for a positive use of the archipelago’s natural and cultural assets. First, collaboration and support are important to development processes. Ideas and commitment
comes from the islanders themselves. The best results occur when the islanders organize themselves in associations. Second, a focus on long term commercial projects in which stakeholders also take charge of what is offered. And finally, the municipality plays an important role as a supporter of projects and a promoter for regional actions (Normark & Lindgren 2008: 35).

Both Aspö and Hemsön have elements of the Rural Development Agency’s recipe for success. For example, both have groups of active islanders who are involved in long-term projects. The projects related to Hemsön tend to be more or less related to the fortress, while the Aspö-projects are characterized by more general projects which indirectly may benefit the hospitality industry.

In conclusion, an active role of the local authorities and support from the regional heritage institutions may result in heritage declarations and generate EU-funding which are crucial for destination development. The local support from the municipality and the regional heritage institutions as well as the well-organized friendship association has also been very important for Hemsön. Aspö, in comparison, lacks support from the local authorities and central heritage institutions, even though there are local entrepreneurs and groups of driving forces who are willing to explore the possibilities of the new heritage. As it seems to be a question of priority, the world heritage essentially drains local initiatives in the archipelago, both morally and economically.

Restaurant Örnästet (Eagle’s Nest) at the exit of Hemsö fortress. The new entrepreneur of the restaurant has taken over the service of the museum from the County museum. He is an important stakeholder for destination development at Hemsön. Photo: Per Strömberg.
Post-societies

One essential conclusion of this study is the fact that the making of Cold War heritage is similar to industrial heritage in view of the heritage process. However, in Sweden, the Cold War heritage has emerged through a more centralized process than the industrial one, principally because the military structures are a matter of national property. Focusing on the similarities, there are many interesting parallels between the industrial and military rationalizations made in the last few decades. What’s more, there are resemblances on the structural level in society.

Since the 1960s, a major part of industry (i.e. shipyard, textile, and mining industries) has been moved from Western countries to low-wage countries, which produce goods more effectively and geographically closer at lower costs, while harbour functions have been relocated to the outskirts of major cities. Western industries have changed and become more knowledge-intensive and demand high-technology. Due to these structural changes, many industries have closed, been destroyed, moved or have been converted into new functions.

This stage in industrial development in the West has earlier been studied by Daniel Bell in his book *The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society* (1973). The notion of post-industrial society was coined in order to describe economic changes in society, in which Bell saw an occurring economic transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy, a diffusion of national and global capital, and mass privatization (Bell 1973: 14). Globalization, digitalization and technological development as well as urbanization, are important key words that have appeared in the past few decades to describe these structural changes.

There are many remarkable similarities between the post-industrial society and that of the post-military society, which is an equivalent notion coined by Martin Shaw (1991). During the last decades, political and economical developments have led to a general and consistent industrial and military structural change which has many things in common. Sometimes, the two areas even converge in mutual dependence as a powerful military-industrial complex, to quote President Eisenhower’s famously warning in his farewell address in 1961.

Post-militarism, much like post-industrialism and post-modernism, is a defining characteristic of the end of the 20th century, a structural transition from the Cold War era, Shaw argues. But just as post-industrialism does not abolish industry, or post-modernism modernity, so, too, post-militarism, while it transforms the military and militarism, does not remove them from central positions in the social structure. Shaw describes post-military society as having two faces. The first is about the new national Defences which are to a large degree professionalized, smaller, with high-tech armaments of unprecedented destructive power. The other face of post-military society is the growing space for non-militarized life which has been opening since the end of the Cold War (Shaw 1991: 184-5). These structural changes also concern the military objectives of European countries with a
greater focus on international conflicts than on national defence. Thus, the national defence seeks new tasks abroad. From that point of view, globalization is another face of the post-military society.

Another important characteristic is technological development. More rational and cheaper production methods have made many Swedish industries superfluous in the same way as many military bases are today. For instance, precision bombing has made subterranean fortresses useless, and the new political and military strategic situations have made officers unemployed. Digitalization and advanced technology have replaced human labour and soldiers in military operations – such as American war drones – in a similar way as in traditional manufacturing industry.

The consequences of these structural changes in post-societies are astonishingly analogous even at the cultural level. One consequence is the large quantity of buildings which have become “vacant” after the former activities have been shut down, and relocated to other geographic areas in the world. These industrial leftover spaces in the outskirts of city-centres command high prices of land, while former military facilities often are located at places in the nature landscape which are low-populated and inaccessible but astonishingly attractive with a low level of exploitation.

This vanishing process creates a mental distance from the former activities. Robert Willim argues that industries are more invisible and anonymous today for ordinary people, even though they do exist, but are distant, or have become “clean” and transparent. Noisy and dirty industrial environments have disappeared. What is left are the traces of an industrial past which is now looked upon with distance and nostalgia. These processes imply a kind of cultural sorting which selects and extracts positive aspects out of context (Willim 2008: 123-4).

The industrial materiality embraces a lot of connotations which are today aesthetically explored and exploited in new different contexts: factories become galleries in the same way as military bunkers become design hotels such as the fortress of Fårösund. The materiality of leftover spaces functions as a scenography for new cultural activities, urban lifestyles and businesses. It is a form of aestheticization, that is, whenever former activities and spaces are being redefined, considered from a mental distance and related to consumption, entertainment, excitement, joy and recreation. But for others, the expressions of the post-societies are equal to economic decline and alienation in society, or, to negative memories.

This mental distance is also a condition for the creation of new cultural heritages. In Sweden, the interest in industrial society emerged in the 1970s. It was later absorbed by the heritage institutions in the late 1990s through a series of cultural projects (such as the ISKA-project) and scholarly conferences (Alzén & Burrell 2005: 11). A growing number of industrial environments have been inventoried and upgraded as historical buildings since then (Dahlström Rittsél 2005: 68-72). The equivalent remains of the Cold War have gone through the same process.
from the beginning of the 1990s. The table summarizes the similarities between these two types of post-societies in the West.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The post-industrial society</th>
<th>The post-military society</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1) Political-economical changes: de-industrialization</strong>&lt;br&gt;A straightforward decline in the output of manufactured goods or in employment in the manufacturing sector; a shift from manufacturing to the service sectors. New strategic demands of mobility and flexibility (for companies).</td>
<td><strong>1) Political-economical changes: de-militarization</strong>&lt;br&gt;End of war preparation in large scale; reduction of nation's army, weapons, and military vehicles to an agreed minimum of weapons and troop forces; professionalization and end of conscription. New strategic demands of mobility and flexibility (for the Defence).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2) Globalization: economic &amp; geographic expansion</strong>&lt;br&gt;Industrial outsourcing and move to low-wage countries; expansion of a global market; multinational companies.</td>
<td><strong>2) Globalization: economic &amp; geographic expansion</strong>&lt;br&gt;Global warfare; move from invasion defence to an internationally engaged input defence; enterprises of national rebuilding after conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3a) General technological development</strong>&lt;br&gt;Better industrial production and process methods.</td>
<td><strong>3a) General technological development</strong>&lt;br&gt;Better industrial production and process methods; development of weapons with more fire power and more precision.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3b) Digitalization: the digital revolution</strong>&lt;br&gt;Digital technology replaces human labour.</td>
<td><strong>3b) Digitalization: the digital revolution</strong>&lt;br&gt;Digital technology replaces soldiers; development of digital precision weapons, remote-controlled weapons, drones; development of a “digital fortress”, a defence against cyber attacks.</td>
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<td><strong>4) Consequences</strong></td>
<td><strong>4) Consequences</strong>&lt;br&gt;The appearance of mental distance and alienation; creation of a new culture heritage; aestheticization, valorization and regeneration processes; appearance of “vacant spaces”.</td>
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The table summarizes the similarities between these two types of post-societies.

**Conclusion**

The Cold War heritage with its redundant military facilities is an expression of a post-military society. It is a heritage born out of crisis. Simultaneously, it’s a reflection of structural change in society, like its analogous twin heritage of the industrial society. It is also the heritage of secrecy, invisibility and silence; built in great secrecy during the Cold War, mostly invisible to its citizens, and dissolved into oblivion. Also, it is a heritage of reassurance, or oppression, depending on who you are asking.

The aim of this paper was to describe the making of the Cold War heritage through a range of processes which imply a shift of function (spatially, legally and socially), a shift of representation (culturally and emotionally), and finally, a shift of management (administratively and economically). With the industrial heritage
process in mind, the case studies have shown that the making of the Cold War heritage depends on an analogous authorized heritage discourse, to employ the notion of Laurajane Smith. The “post-military” landscape of bunkers and rusting barbed wires is regarded with the same romanticism and with similar preservation ideology and economical interests as the post-industrial landscape earlier was. Similar negotiation issues appear, and the negotiations are made by similar stakeholders.

The discourse includes heritage grammar based on a series of repeated notions and practices based on a common two-step-change: First, from military building to heritage – a conversion process which implies practices of identification and selection (investigations by cultural heritage institutions and researchers); declaration (up-grading decision-making by the authorities); salvation (emotional preservation actions by private initiatives and driving forces); depiction (nostalgic and popularized presentations by artists, authors and directors) – and secondly, from heritage to attraction: preservation (protection and management by cultural heritage institutions); valorization (implied by regional planners, museums and tourism entrepreneurs); and finally, education, sensation and socialization (activities by visitors on the site).

All these practices are directly related to the spatial transformation of the military buildings, more precisely, how the representational space of the military base – with its former collective symbols of national defence power, masculinity, reassurance, resistance, etc. – is transformed into a tourist site with new meanings for visitors and former officers. This does also entail a change of spatial practices, namely, how newly founded military-historical museums re-consider military space and divide it into (social) zones for exhibitions and guided tours, and how visitors finally perform and take it into possession. The foundation of a new heritage does as well imply new representations of space which are implemented by the heritage institutions when space is intellectually conceptualised as the abstract notion of a heritage.

What actually differs is that the heritage of the Cold War was developed through a deeply centralized selection process directed by administration authorities. One of the reasons is that the military heritage was, and still is in many cases, a state property, while industrial buildings for the most part are privately owned without institutional control. Retired officers and local driving forces are an essential but not decisive factor in defining military bases as a heritage. Persuasion campaigns and preservation actions are the means by which the heritage and its cultural value are negotiated. Together with support from the municipality and local, the driving forces form lobby groups that place pressure on politicians and heritage institutions. The making of a cultural heritage is ultimately not only an institutional but also an individual matter.

Finally, why should one tell the story about the war that never came? It’s difficulty to recognize a cultural heritage that was scarcely experienced by the public.
But as Andersson & Bodin states, it’s an essential key to understand contemporary society. Other large civilian building projects in the Swedish society at the time, such as the nuclear plants and the housing programs, are not possible to understand if you don’t relate them to the large military projects. The Cold War narrative is both extensive and complex – and international. A narrative about the subterranean fortresses in Sweden must include the supposed “enemy”, the threat from the Baltic nuclear silos of the USSR (Andersson & Bodin 2008: 93-4). But for the new entrepreneur at Hemsö fortress, who wants sell the secrets of the Cold War, the narrative of the past is just a way to create a new future.

PhD Per Strömberg, art historian, defended his thesis *Upplevelseindustrins turistmiljöer* in 2007 on the spatial connection and symbiotic processes between business and aesthetics through narratives in today’s tourism industry. He is now a post doctor at the Centre of Experience Economy, BI Norwegian School of Management. The pd-project focuses on the reuse of buildings as a cultural innovation strategy in tourism, event and retailing. E-mail: per.stromberg@bi.no

Notes

1 The project was financed by Stiftelsen för kunskapsfrämjande inom turism, Sweden, in 2008.
2 The recognition of the concept “negative heritage” is connected to the inscription in 1979 by UNESCO of Auschwitz Concentration Camp as a World Heritage Site (Dolff-Bonekämper 2002; Roth & Salas 2001).
3 Gruta Park and Museum of Genocide in Lithuania are among the exceptions.

References


**Reports**

(for a complete list used in the original report, see Strömberg, 2009)

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**Interviews**

(for a complete list used in the original report, see Strömberg, 2009)

Interview with *Hemsö skärgårdsförening* (SO Eriksson, Karl Bäcklund, Torsten Norberg, Roland Eriksson) tillsammans med Ulf Wessling, SFV, the 1 of September 2008.

Interview with Olle Melin, the 6 of October 2008.

Interview with Ivar Wenster, kulturchef Karlskrona kommun, samt Richard Bauer & Hans Line- skär på Marinmuseum Karlskrona, the 7 of October 2008.